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Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) suffer from sensor drifts in GPS denied environments,
which can cause safety issues. To avoid intolerable sensor drifts while completing the time-
critical coordination task for multi-UAV systems, we propose a safety constrained bi-level
control framework. The first level is the time-critical coordination level that achieves a consensus
of coordination states and provides a virtual target which is a function of the coordination
state. The second level is the safety-critical control level that is designed to follow the virtual
target while adapting the attacked UAV(s) at a path re-planning level to support resilient state
estimation. In particular, the time-critical coordination level framework generates the desired
speed and position profile of the virtual target based on the multi-UAV cooperative mission
by the proposed consensus protocol algorithm. The safety-critical control level is able to make
each UAV follow its assigned path while detecting the attacks, estimating the state resiliently,
and driving the UAV(s) outside the effective range of the spoofing device within the escape
time. The numerical simulations of a three-UAV system demonstrate the effectiveness of the
proposed safety constrained bi-level control framework.
I. Introduction
In recent years, there has been an increasing interest in multi-UAV systems due to the wide range of applications,
including civilian transportation [1], aerial photography for agriculture [2], searching and rescuing [3], and other
cooperative tasks. In order to get accurate and reliable state measurements for completing various cooperative tasks
safely, the global positioning system (GPS) is the most widely used senor for multi-UAV systems. However, GPS
receivers are potentially vulnerable to various types of attacks, such as blocking, jamming, and spoofing [4]. The
Vulnerability Assessment Team at Los Alamos National Laboratory has demonstrated that the civilian GPS spoofing
attacks can be easily implemented by using GPS simulator [5]. Furthermore, GPS is more vulnerable when its signal
strength is weak. In particular, due to various applications of multi-UAV systems, the operating environment becomes
diverse as well, where GPS signals are weak or even denied due to other structures such as skyscrapers, elevated
highways, bridges, and mountains.
Literature review. One of the GPS spoofing attack detection techniques is to analyze raw antenna signals or utilize
multi-antenna receiver systems. The GPS spoofing attack can be detected by checking whether the default radiation
pattern is changed in [6]. A multi-antenna receiver system was used to detect GPS spoofing attacks by monitoring the
angle-of-arrival of the spoofing attempts in [7]. As an extension of this work, the GPS spoofing mitigation has also been
investigated where an array of antennas is utilized to obtain genuine GPS signals by spatial filtering [8–10]. However,
those solutions require modifications of the hardware or the low-level computing modules and assume that an attacker
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can only use single-antenna spoofing systems. Furthermore, the attacker can spoof the GPS receivers without being
detected if multi-antenna spoofing devices are available [11].
In Cyber-physical system (CPS) security literature, GPS spoofing attacks have been described as a malicious signal
injection to the genuine sensor output [12]. Attack detection against malicious signal injection has been widely studied
over the last few years. The attack detection problem has been formulated as an `0/`∞ optimization problem, which is
NP-hard in [13, 14]. The fundamental limitations of structural detectability, as well as graph-theoretical detectability
for linear time-invariant systems, have been studied in [15], where distributed attack detection has also been studied.
The attack detection problem has been formulated as an attack-resilient estimation problem of constrained state and
unknown input in [16]. A switching mode resilient detection and estimation framework for GPS spoofing attacks has
been studied in [17]. Attack detection using multiple GPS signals by checking cross-correlation was introduced in [18].
In [19], the maximum deviations of the state were identified due to the sensor attacks while remaining stealthy due
to the detection. Resilience to cyber-attacks for multi-agent systems becomes more challenging than for single-agent
systems. There has been much effort in investigating resilient strategies for multi-agent systems in the presence of
cyber-attack. A method of switching the network topologies is utilized to secure consensus tracking performance in
the presence of the cyber-attack on communication channels in [20]. In [21], an event-triggered mechanism and a
distributed observer-based controller are designed to ensure the overall consensus of multi-agent systems is achieved.
The coordinated path following design based on an adaptive control method and a synchronization scheme is presented
in [22], where coordinated path following goal is achieved. These architectures can efficiently handle a class of attacks
for multi-agent systems, but do not consider fundamental problems indirectly induced by attacks and cannot address the
significant problem due to limited sensor availability in the presence of cyber-attacks.
Contribution. The current paper addresses safety problems induced by limited sensor availability due to GPS
spoofing attacks while completing the time-critical coordination task for a Multi-UAV system. We model the sensor
drift problem in the presence of GPS spoofing attacks as an increasing variance of state estimation to quantify the
sensor drift and introduce escape time under which the state estimation error remains within a tolerable error with
high confidence. We propose a safety constrained bi-level control framework for multi-UAV systems that adapts the
UAV(s) at a path re-planning level to support resilient state estimation against GPS spoofing attacks. The proposed
framework achieves a consensus of coordination state at the time-critical coordination level and is equipped with an
escape controller (ESC) that drives the UAV(s) away from the effective range of the spoofing device within the escape
time to avoid intolerable sensor drift at safety-critical control level.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In Section II, we introduce the notation convention, definition of
the escape time and the dynamic system models for multi-UAV systems. In the same section, we formulate the problem.
In Section III, we propose a resilient safety constrained bi-level control framework. In Section IV, the numerical
simulations of the multi-UAV system for a time-critical mission under the GPS spoofing attack is presented. Section V
draws the conclusion.
II. Preliminaries
A. Notation
We use the subscript k of xk to denote the time index; Rn+ denotes the set of positive elements in the n-dimensional
Euclidean space; Rn×m denotes the set of all n × m real matrices; A>, tr (A) and A−1 denote the transpose, trace and
inverse of matrix A, respectively; I denotes the identity matrix with an appropriate dimension; ‖ · ‖ denotes the standard
Euclidean norm for a vector or an induced matrix norm; × is used to denote Cartesian product; E[ · ] denotes the
expectation operator. For a matrix S, S > 0 and S ≥ 0 indicate that S is positive definite and positive semi-definite,
respectively.
B. Escape time
In the presence of the GPS spoofing attack, the state estimation algorithm relies on the relative measurement sensors
because the GPS signals do not contain legitimate information. In this case, the variance of the state estimation errors is
strictly increasing and unbounded in time (Theorem 4.2 in [17]). Regarding the sensor drift problem, we utilize a new
resilience measure, escape time, which is defined as follows:
Definition II.1 [17] The escape time kesc ≥ 0 is the time difference between the attack time ka and the first time
instance when the estimation error ‖xk − xˆk ‖ is not within the tolerable error distance ζ ∈ Rn+ with the significance α,
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i.e.
kesc = arg min
k≥ka
k − ka
s.t. ζ>P−1k ζ < χ
2
d f (α),
where Pk is the error covariance of xk − xˆk , and χ2 is the chi-squared test value with degree of freedom df .
The escape time provides a new safety criterion for optimal control with increasing uncertainties. It is worth to notice
that the escape time kesc can be calculated by Algorithm 1 in [17].
C. System model
In what follows, we describe the multi-UAV system in detail.
1. Agent model
Consider the discrete-time dynamic system model of the single agent:
xk+1 = Axk + Buk + wk (1a)
yGk = C
G xk + dk + vGk (1b)
yIk = C
I (xk − xk−1) + vIk (1c)
where xk ∈ Rn is the state, uk ∈ Rm is the control input and A, B, CG and CI are the system matrix, input matrix, and
output matrix with proper sizes. The sensor measurement yG
k
∈ RmG is the GPS measurement which may be corrupted
by unknown GPS spoofing signal dk ∈ RmG . We assume that the attacker can inject any signal dk into yGk . The sensor
measurement yI
k
∈ RmI is the inertial measurement unit (IMU) measurement which returns a noisy measurement of
the state difference. The output yI
k
can represent any relative sensor measurement, such as velocity measurement by a
camera. In this paper, we use IMU for the illustration.
The noise signals wk , vGk and v
I
k
are assumed to be independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) Gaussian random
variables with zero means and covariances E[wkw>k ] = Σw ≥ 0, E[vGk (vGk )>] = ΣG > 0, and E[vIk (vIk )>] = ΣI > 0,
respectively.
2. Multi-agent network
Let xi,k ∈ Rn, i = 1, · · · , N be the state of the ith agent associated with dynamic system model (1) where N
is the total number of the agents. Graph theory can provide the natural abstractions for how information is shared
between agents in a network [23]. An undirected graph G = (V, E) consists of a set of nodes V = {1, 2, · · · , N}, which
corresponds to the different agents, and a set of edges E ⊂ V × V , which relates to a set of unordered pairs of agents. In
particular, (i, j), ( j, i) ∈ E if and only if there exists a communication channel between agents i and j. The neighborhood
N(i) ⊆ V of the agent i will be understood as the set { j ∈ V | (i, j) ∈ E}.
3. Path following consensus
Each agent i ∈ V has a desired trajectory gi : si,k → Rns that is parameterized by coordination state variable
si,k ∈ [0, 1] as shown in Fig. 1. Dimension ns is usually 2 (2−D mission) or 3 (3−D mission). At time k, gi(si,k) is the
virtual target that the agent i follows at that time, i.e., agent i pursues to minimize the error ‖gi(si,k) − xi,k ‖ which is
marked in red in Fig. 1. The state si,k can be seen as a normalized length of trajectory. The agents also desire to achieve
the consensus of the coordination state variable
si,k − sj,k k→∞−→ 0 ∀i, j ∈ V,
so that the virtual targets of the agents arrive at the destination at the same time.
The agent i knows coordination state si,k as well as the coordination states sj,k for neighboring agents j ∈ N(i).
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Fig. 1 Illustration of the path following consensus. The goal of the multi-agent system is for all agents to reach
the desired goal state simultaneously. For the agent i at time k, the virtual target/predetermined desired state is
gi(si,k) and the true state is xi,k . The error between the virtual target gi(si,k) and the true state xi,k (marked in
red) is to be minimized. The attacker is on the path of the agent j and the effective spoofing area is displayed as
the light blue circle. When the attack is detected, the agent j will be re-planning the trajectory so that the state
estimation errors remain in the tolerable region, while the other agents will adjust their coordination states
accordingly to achieve time-coordination.
D. Problem Statement
Given a multi-agent network described in Section II.C.2 consisting of number of N agents described in (1), the
agent i, where i = 1, · · · , N , aims to follow its desired trajectory gi(·) with a reference rate ρ, i.e.,
gi(si,k) − xi,k k→∞−→ 0 (2a)
si,k+1 − si,k k→∞−→ ρ, (2b)
and to achieve time coordination, i.e.,
si,k − sj,k k→∞−→ 0 (3)
for all i, j ∈ V , and for all k ≥ 0. Meanwhile, each agent aims to detect the GPS spoofing attack; obtain the attack-resilient
state estimation when considering the limited sensor availability; complete the path following mission securely.
III. Safety Constrained Bi-level Control Framework
To address the problem described in Section II.D for a multi-agent system, we propose a safety constrained bi-level
control framework shown in Fig. 2. The first level, time-critical coordination level, is designed to achieve time
coordination with the assigned trajectories. The second level is at safety-critical control level that supports resilient
estimation and path following control. The safety constrained bi-level control framework consists of a time-critical
coordinator at the time-critical coordination level; an attack detector, a resilient state estimator, a robust controller, and
an escape controller (ESC) at the safety-critical control level.
The following explains each module in the proposed framework as shown in Fig. 2.
Time-critical coordinator. The time coordination algorithm guarantees that each agent reaches an agreement on
some distributed variables of interest; i.e., the coordination state variables. With the coordination state variables, the
assigned trajectories generate the virtual targets for UAVs to follow.
Safety-critical controller. The robust controller is a complex controller that operates the UAV to follow the virtual
targets in the presence of noise, but without the presence of attacks. The robust controller can be implemented as any
effective control technique such as optimal control, model predictive control, PID, etc. The escape controller (ESC) is a
model predictive controller (MPC)-based structure that adapts the UAV at a path re-planning level for safe operation.
ESC drives the UAV out of the effective range of the spoofing device within the escape time.
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Fig. 2 A safety constrained bi-level control framework consisting of an attack-resilient monitor, a safety-critical
controller and a time critical coordinator.
Attack-resilient monitor. The resilient state estimator is developed based on the Kalman-filter like state estimator.
The attack detector is designed by the χ2-based anomaly detection algorithm. Based on the previous estimation from the
resilient state estimator, the Boolean output (the dot-dashed line in Fig. 2) of the attack detector determines i) whether
the GPS measurement should be used for the state estimation and ii) the switching rule between the two controllers: the
robust controller and the escape controller (ESC).
In what follows, each subsection describes the details of the corresponding component.
A. Time coordination (Consensus Protocol)
Consider the coordinate state of the consensus network model
si,k+1 = si,k + zi,k, (4)
where zi,k ≥ 0 is the control input for the coordination state of the agent i at time index k. To solve the path following
consensus problem in (2) and (3), we propose the design of the control input zi,k . The control input zi,k is designed by
zi,k = max
−ke‖g(si,k) − xi ‖ − ks
∑
j∈N(i)
(si,k − sj,k) + ρ + 1attacked zˆi,k, 0
 , (5)
where ke > 0 and ks > 0 are coordination control gains, and the reference rate ρ is the desired rate of progress that is
a constant. The first term −ke‖g(si,k) − xi ‖ indicates that the agent reduces the coordination speed when there is a
tracking error. The second term −ks ∑j∈N(i)(si,k − sj,k) is the consensus term which reduces errors between the local
coordination state with those of the neighbors. The third term ρ is the desired rate if there is no tracking error and no
coordination error. The last term zˆi,k = ke‖g(si,k) − xi ‖ drives the virtual target away from the spoofing device even
when the UAV detours the planned trajectory. Function 1i,attacked is an indicator function and 1i,attacked = 1 if an attack
is detected, otherwise 1i,attacked = 0. Moreover, if −ke‖g(si,k) − xi ‖ − ks ∑j∈N(i)(si,k − sj,k) + ρ + 1i,attacked zˆi,k is less
than zero, then the virtual target chooses to stay at current state rather than go backwards.
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B. Resilient State Estimator
The defender implements an estimator and χ2 detector to estimate the state and detect the GPS spoofing attack. The
following Kalman-filter like state estimator is used to estimate the current state:
xˆk = Axˆk−1 + Buk−1 + KGk (yGk − CG(Axˆk−1 + Buk−1)) + K Ik (yIk − CI (Axˆk−1 + Buk−1 − xˆk−1)) (6)
Pk = (A − KkCA + KkDC)Pk−1(A − KkCA + KkDC)> + (I − KkC)Σw(I − KkC)> + KkΣyK>k , (7)
where xˆk is the state estimate and Pk is the state estimation error covariance at time k. We define
Kk :=
[
KG
k
K I
k
]
, C :=
[
CG
CI
]
, Σy :=
[
ΣG 0
0 ΣI
]
, and D :=
[
0 0
0 I
]
.
The optimal gain Kk , given by
Kk = (APk−1(CA − DC)> + ΣwC>)
((CA − DC)Pk−1(CA − DC)> + CΣwC> + Σy )−1 ,
is the solution of the optimization problem minKk tr (Pk).
In [17], it has been shown that the covariance in (7) is bounded when the GPS signal is available. If the GPS is
denied, and only the relative sensor yI
k
is available, the covariance is strictly increasing and is unbounded in time. That
is, the sensor drift problem can be formulated as instability of the covariance matrix.
C. Attack Detector
We conduct the χ2 test to detect the GPS spoofing attacks:
H0 : dk = 0; H1 : dk , 0, (8)
using CUSUM (CUmulative SUM) algorithm, which is widely used in attack detection research [24–26].
Since dk = yGk −CG xk − vGk , given the previous state estimate xˆk−1, we estimate the attack vector by comparing the
sensor output and the output prediction:
dˆk = yGk − CG(Axˆk−1 + Buk−1). (9)
Note that the current estimate xˆk should not be used for the prediction, because it is correlated with the current output;
i.e., E[xˆk(yGk )>] , 0. Due to the Gaussian noises wk and vk injected to the linear system in (1), the states follow
Gaussian distribution since any finite linear combination of Gaussian distributions is also Gaussian. Similarly, dˆk is
Gaussian as well, and thus the use of χ2 test (8) is justified. In particular, the χ2 test compares the normalized attack
vector estimate dˆ>
k
(Pd
k
)−1 dˆk with χ2d f (α):
Accept H0, if dˆ>k (Pdk )−1 dˆk ≤ χ2d f (α)
Accept H1, if dˆ>k (Pdk )−1 dˆk > χ2d f (α),
(10)
where Pd
k
:= E[(dk − dˆk)(dk − dˆk)>] = CG(APk−1A> + Σw)(CG)> + ΣG , and χ2d f (α) is the threshold found in the
Chi-square table. In χ2
d f
(α), df denotes the degree of freedom, and α denotes the statistical significance level.
To reduce false positive/negative due to noise, we use the test (10) in a cumulative form. The proposed χ2 CUSUM
detector is characterized by the detector state Sk ∈ R+:
Sk = δSk−1 + (dˆk)>(Pdk )−1 dˆk, S0 = 0, (11)
where 0 < δ < 1 is the pre-determined forgetting factor. At each time k, the CUSUM detector (11) is used to update the
detector state Sk and detect the attack.
The attack detector will i) update the estimated state xˆk and the error covariance Pk in (7) with KGk = 0 and ii)
switch the controller to ESC, if
Sk >
∞∑
i=0
δi χ2d f (α) =
χ2
d f
(α)
1 − δ . (12)
If Sk <
χ2
d f
(α)
1−δ , then it returns to the robust control mode.
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Remark III.1 As shown in Fig. 3, the resilient state estimation uses the GPS measurement and the IMU measurement to
estimate the state by (6) for the detection purpose as in (9). When the GPS attack is detected, only the IMU measurement
is used to estimate the state for the control purpose as in (6) and (7) with KG
k
= 0.
Fig. 3 Resilient state estimator. GPS and IMU measurements are used in the Estimator 1 (Est. 1). Estimator
2 (Est. 2) only uses the IMU measurement. Est. 1 is used to estimate the state by (6) for the detection as in (9).
When GPS is free of attacks, Est. 1 is also used to estimate the state for the control since the GPS measurement
is trustful. In the presence of the GPS attack, Est. 2 is used for the control.
D. Escape Controller (ESC)
In the presence of the GPS spoofing attack, the variance Pk in (7) of the state estimation errors is strictly increasing
and unbounded in time (Thm. 4.2 [17]), and the escape time provides a new criterion for optimal trajectory regeneration
with increasing uncertainties. The goal of ESC is to drive the UAV outside of the effective range of the spoofing device
within the escape time so that the state estimation error remains within the tolerable region with a predetermined
probability. In particular, the safety constraint can be formulated as
d(xaka+kesc , xka+kesc ) − reffect > 0, (13)
where xa
k
denotes the location of the attacker at time k, ka and kesc are the attack time and the escape time, and the
function d(a, b) measures the distance between a and b. The value reffect is the upper bound of the effective range of the
spoofing device. The safety constraint (13) implies that ESC should drive the UAV outside of the effective range of the
spoofing device within the escape time.
Remark III.2 We assume that the upper bound of the effective range reffect and the location of the attacker xak are
known. Due to hardware constraints, the output power/nominal strength of the spoofing device is bounded where the
output power determines the effective range of the spoofing device. The distance between the attacker and UAV can be
obtained by monitoring the injected GPS signal strength using Friis transmission equation [27]. The location of the
attacker can be estimated similar to locating the epicenter of an earthquake, which can be done with at least three
measurements from different seismic stations by measuring a series of GPS signal strengths from different locations of
the UAV.
There are two key challenges for considering the safety constraint (13). First, the states and the attacker location
are unknown, and their estimates xˆi and xˆai are subject to stochastic noise. Moreover, we cannot guarantee that the
safety constraint (13) is always feasible. Addressing the above two challenges, we replace the safety constraint (13) by
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the repulsive potential function [28] as a high penalty in the cost function which is active only after the escape time
ka + kesc . The repulsive potential function Urep(D) is defined as the following:
Urep(D) :=

1
2 β
(
1
D − 1reffect
)2
if D ≤ reffect
0 if D > reffect
,
which can be constructed based on the distance between the location of the attacker and the location of UAV,
D := d(xa
ka+kesc
, xˆka+kesc ). The scaling parameter β is a large constant, which represents a penalty when the constraint
has not been fulfilled. Utilizing the soft constraint, we reformulate the MPC problem as follows:
Program III.1
min
u
ka+N∑
i=ka
ˆ˜x>i+1Qi ˆ˜xi+1 + u
>
i Riui +
ka+N∑
i=ka+kesc
Urep(Di)
s.t. xˆi+1 = Axˆi + Bui
h(xˆi, ui) ≤ 0 (14)
for i = ka, ka + 1, · · · , ka + N,
where N ≥ kesc is the prediction horizon, ˆ˜xi is defined as the difference between the state estimation and the goal state
at time index i, i.e., ˆ˜xi := xˆi − xgoali , Qi and Ri are symmetric positive definite weight matrices, and xˆai is the estimate
of the attacker location. Value reffect is the upper bound of the effective range of the spoofing device. Inequality (14) is
any nonlinear constraint on the state estimation xˆi (e.g., velocity) and the control input ui (e.g., acceleration).
Remark III.3 Each agent obtains the attacker’s information and switches to ESC when it is under attack. In the cases
that a large portion of the planned trajectory is inside the effective range of the spoofing device, following the virtual
target may cause the agent to re-enter the effective range when the agent switches back to the robust controller. Once the
agent obtains the attacker information, it will share with the robust controller to avoid re-entering.
Remark III.4 Comparing to the use of the repulsive potential functionUrep in the collision avoidance literature [29–31],
the proposed application of the repulsive potential function in Program III.1 has two differences. First of all, the
repulsive potential function is known before the collision happens in collision avoidance literature, while we can only get
the repulsive potential function Urep after the collision happens, i.e., only after the UAV has entered the effective range
of the spoofing device. Second, the repulsive potential functionUrep is only counted in the cost function in Program III.1
after the escape time.
IV. Simulation
The scenario in Fig. 1 is used to demonstrate the efficacy of the proposed framework. In the simulation, three UAVs
are moving to the desired goal positions simultaneously from different initial locations by using feedback control∗ based
on the state estimate from (6). When one of the UAVs is in the effective range of the spoofing device, its state estimate
will be no longer trustful. After the GPS measurement is turned off, the only available relative state measurement
causes the sensor drift problem [17]. The UAV will switch the controller from the robust controller to ESC when the
attack is detected, using ESC to escape away from the attacker within the escape time, while all UAVs will adjust
their coordination states if necessary to achieve time-coordination. The online computation of ESC is described in
Program III.1 done using Julia, and ESC is implemented by using JuMP [32] package with Ipopt solver.
A. Single UAV Model
We use a double integrator UAV dynamics under the GPS spoofing attack as in [33]. The discrete time state vector
xk considers planar position and velocity at time step k, i.e.
xk = [rxk , ryk , vxk , vyk ]>,
∗We implemented a proportional-derivative (PD) like tracking controller, which is widely used for double integrator systems.
8
where rx
k
, ry
k
denote x, y position coordinates, and vx
k
, v
y
k
denote velocity coordinates. We consider the acceleration of
UAV as the control input uk = [uxk, uyk ]>. We assume that the state constraint and control input constraint are given as√
(vx
k
)2 + (vy
k
)2 ≤ 5,
√
(ux
k
)2 + (uy
k
)2 ≤ 2.
With sampling time at 0.1 seconds, the double integrator model is discretized into the following matrices:
A =

1 0 0.1 0
0 1 0 0.1
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1

, B =

0 0
0 0
0.1 0
0 0.1

,
and the outputs yG
k
and yI
k
are the position measurements from GPS and the velocity measurements from IMU, with the
output matrices:
CG =
[
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
]
, CI =
[
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
]
.
The covariance matrices of the sensing and disturbance noises are chosen as Σw = 0.1I, ΣG = I and ΣI = 0.01I.
B. Trajectory generation and time coordination for multi-UAV systems
The nominal trajectories of a three-UAV system gi(si,k), where i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, are generated by the cubic Bézier curves
[34]
gi(si,k) , (1 − si,k)3P(0)i + 3(1 − si,k)2si,kP(1)i + 3(1 − si,k)s2i,kP(2)i + s3i,kP(3)i , (15)
where si,k ∈ [0, 1] is the coordination state and P(j)i , where j ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}, are the control points for the agent i. The
control points we used are listed in Table 1.
HHHHHi
( j) (0) (1) (2) (3)
1 [0 , 0]> [100, 100]> [10, 300]> [190, 400]>
2 [200, 0]> [100, 100]> [250, 200]> [200, 400]>
3 [400, 0]> [450, 150]> [300, 300]> [210, 400]>
Table 1 Bézier curve control points P(j)i
Fig. 4a shows the trajectories generated by (15), and the Bézier curve control points for each agent are marked
with colored dots. Agent i aims to follow the trajectory starting from point P(0)i and plans to arrive at the destination
point P(3)i simultaneously. To achieve these goals, the time coordination controller proposed in (5) is used to update
the consensus network in (4); then a proportional-derivative (PD) tracking controller is used to track the virtual target
generated by the coordination state in (4).
The parameters used in (5) and the PD controller were set to the following values:
ρ =
1
1200
, ke = 0.005, ks = 0.005, kp = 0.05 and ki = 0.315,
where kp and ki are the proportional gain and the derivative gain.
Fig. 4b shows the path following and time coordination results. A series of locations of the three agents are plotted
by the hex points. Their connections by the dotted lines indicates that they have the same coordination states. We can
see that the time coordination and PD control are both well designed, and all of the agents arrived at goal destination
simultaneously.
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(a) Trajectories of the three agents in dashed lines
generated by Bézier curves (15) using the control
points summarized in Table 1.
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(b) Path following trajectories of three agents are
plotted in solid lines. Every three hex points con-
nected by two dotted lines indicate the locations
of three agents at the same coordination state.
Fig. 4 Trajectory generation
C. In the presence of GPS spoofing attack
The GPS attack happens when the UAV is in the effective range of the spoofing device. In this attack scenario, the
attack signal is dk = [10, 10]> and the effective range of the spoofing device reffect = 30. The location of the attacker
is xa
k
= [200, 200]>, which is unknown to the UAV until it is inside the effective range of the spoofing device. The
estimation obtained by (9) is shown in Fig. 5a. The detector state Sk can be obtained by using the estimated attack
signal as in (11). The abnormal high detector state values shown in Fig. 5b implies that there is an attack. Statistical
significance of the attack is tested using the CUSUM detector described in (12) with the significance α at 1%. The
threshold is calculated by
χ2
d f
(α)
1−δ with α = 0.01 and δ = 0.15.
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Fig. 5 Attack estimation and detection.
ESC in Program III.1 with the prediction horizon N = kesc + 50 and the scaling parameter β = 10000 is used to
generate the new trajectory for safety operation. Fig. 6 shows the trajectory of the simulated attack scenario. ESC drives
the attacked UAV away from the effective range of the spoofing device; time coordination is achieved and all of the
agents arrive at the destination points simultaneously.
Fig. 7 presents how the proposed control framework performs in different cases where reffect ∈ {15, 50, 60, 70}.
Regardless of the size of reffect, the UAV will escape the effective range within the escape time and achieve time
coordination. In Fig. 7a, the attacked UAV can pass the attacker without changing the direction or even its speed, since
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Fig. 6 Trajectory in the presence of the attack. The attacker is located at [200, 200]> with reffect = 30, which is
displayed as the light blue circle.
reffect is small enough. From Fig. 7b to Fig. 7d, the UAV drives away from the effective range within the escape time and
tries to get back to the assigned trajectory.
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Fig. 7 Trajectories when attacker is located at [200, 200]> with different effective ranges.
V. Conclusion
We presented a safety-constrained bi-level control framework for multi-UAV systems that achieves a consensus of
coordination states at the time-critical coordination level and adapts the UAV(s) to support resilient state estimation and
path re-planning at the safety-critical control level. In particular, the time coordination and the trajectory generation
guaranteed the consensus of coordination states and provide the virtual targets for UAV(s) to follow at the first level.
A resilient state estimator has been designed and the χ2 CUSUM algorithm is used for attack detection. The state
estimation suffers from the increasing variance due to the limited senor availability in the presence of the GPS spoofing
attack. In this case, the robust controller cannot drive the attacked UAV(s) outside the effective range of the spoofing
device with the tolerable estimation errors. The large estimation errors will cause safety problems and will fail the
global path following mission. To solve these problems, the escape controller (ESC) was designed to escape away from
the effective range of the spoofing device within the escape time and complete the global path following mission safely.
The simulations of a three-UAV system were given to demonstrate the results.
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